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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mark Cuban is a billionaire entrepreneur and active investor.1  One 
of his more recent ventures is as majority partner in Sharesleuth.com, a 
web-based reporting site “aimed at exposing securities fraud and 
corporate chicanery.”2  Mark Cuban has also made news of late as a 
defendant in an action brought against him by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for insider trading.3  The SEC alleges that he violated 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 and 17 C.F.R.  
§ 240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5)5 when he sold his stock in Mamma.com, Inc. 
after the company’s CEO told him material, confidential information 
concerning a private investment in public equity (PIPE) offering 
Mamma.com planned to make.6  Cuban owned a 6.3% stake of 
Mamma.com, making him the company’s largest known shareholder.7  
Before the announcement of the PIPE, Mamma.com’s CEO called Cuban 
to let him know about the company’s plans and to invite him to 
participate in the PIPE.8  Before apprising Cuban of the upcoming PIPE, 
the CEO first secured Cuban’s assurance that he would keep the 
information confidential.9  Cuban agreed and ended the call by saying, 
                                                     
*  Associate Professor, John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, Georgia.  Many thanks to my 
friend and colleague, Professor Jeffrey A. Van Detta, for reviewing prior drafts of this Article. 
 1. Harold K. Gordon et al., The SEC’s Insider Trading Case Against Mark Cuban and Rule 
10b5-2, CORPORATE COUNSEL: LAW.COM (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticle 
FriendlyCC.jsp?id=1202432694779. 
 2. SHARESLEUTH, http://sharesleuth.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2010). 
 3. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, remanded, 620 F.3d 
551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 6. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 717. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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“Well, now I’m screwed.  I can’t sell.”10  Yet he did.11  Within a minute 
after hanging up with the CEO, Cuban directed his broker to sell his 
entire 6.3% interest.12  By selling his stock before public announcement 
of the PIPE offering, Cuban avoided losses in excess of $750,000.13 
The SEC alleged that Cuban was liable under the misappropriation 
theory of insider trading.14  Because he agreed to keep whatever 
information the CEO told him confidential and never informed 
Mamma.com of his intention to sell his stock after learning of the PIPE, 
Cuban violated a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and 
confidence he owed to Mamma.com.15  The SEC argued that his 
agreement to keep the information confidential created the necessary 
relationship which imposed on Cuban a duty to disclose to Mamma.com 
his intent to trade.16  On July 17, 2009, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas dismissed the complaint against Cuban.17  
Although the court agreed with the SEC that an agreement can form the 
basis of a duty to disclose, it held that an agreement such as Cuban’s 
must consist of more than a promise to keep the information 
confidential.18  The agreement must consist of a promise not to use the 
information.19  According to the Court, Cuban’s agreement with 
Mamma.com’s CEO lacked any obligation to refrain from trading or 
otherwise using the confidential information.20 
The district court case against Mark Cuban is another in a line of 
cases in which defendants who trade using misappropriated confidential 
information are not held liable for insider trading.21  The cases are rather 
                                                     
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 718. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  The PIPE offering is a way to raise capital but has the effect of diluting existing 
shareholders’ ownership interests, a fact of which Cuban was well aware.  Id. at 717.  Therefore, 
once the PIPE offering was announced, Mamma.com’s stock price declined.  Id. at 718. 
 14. Id. at 717–18. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 717. 
 18. Id. at 724–26. 
 19. Id. at 726. 
 20. Id. at 731.  The Fifth Circuit recently vacated the district court’s judgment, dismissing the 
case and remanding for further proceedings.  SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2010).  The 
Fifth Circuit reasoned that a plausible basis existed to find that Mamma.com’s CEO and Cuban had 
an understanding that Cuban would not trade using the information he learned about the PIPE.  Id. at 
557. 
 21. See, e.g., SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 530 F.3d 1085 (9th 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002); United States v. Cassese, 
273 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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remarkable, in part because many involve defendants who ought to know 
better.  They are corporate presidents and board members, savvy 
investors, and, in Cuban’s case, a principal in a company that ferrets out 
securities fraud.  From an analytical standpoint, these cases are troubling 
because of the way in which the fiduciary requirement from Chiarella v. 
United States,22 a United States Supreme Court case concerning the 
misappropriation theory, hampers a finding of liability.23 
Paradoxically, the fiduciary requirement has its origins in the 
landmark administrative decision Cady, Roberts & Co.24  There, the SEC 
determined that the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 “are not intended 
as a specification of particular acts or practices which constitute fraud, 
but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices by 
which undue advantage may be taken of investors and others.”25  
Certainly, corporate insiders may be liable for failure to disclose 
“material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but 
which are not known to persons with whom they deal.”26  But as Rule 
10b-5’s prohibitions relate to “any person,” anyone in possession of 
material, nonpublic information is under a duty either to abstain from 
trading on the basis of that information or disclose that information to 
investors.  The SEC determined that an obligation to disclose or abstain 
arose first from  
the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to 
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and 
not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent 
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information 
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.27 
From this case, insider trading became a claim rooted in nonfeasance—
an omission or failure to do something—as opposed to misfeasance—
actively doing an unlawful act.  In other words, the defendant may face 
liability if he failed to disclose material, nonpublic information in 
                                                     
 22. 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). 
 23. Other courts, however, have found a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and 
confidence existed, sometimes in strikingly similar factual scenarios to the cases where other courts 
held none existed.  See, e.g., SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 2003); SEC v. 
Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477, 488–90 (N.D. Tex. 2005). 
 24. Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 911 (Nov. 8, 1961); see also David 
Cowan Bayne, The Insider’s Natural-Law Duty: Chestman and the ‘Misappropriation Theory,’ 43 
U. KAN. L. REV. 79, 88–89 (1994). 
 25. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC Docket at 911. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 912 (citation omitted). 
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violation of a duty to disclose.  The fraud, or deception, necessary for 
Rule 10b-5 liability is this failure to disclose the information to someone 
to whom you owe a duty. 
The Supreme Court in Chiarella refined the Cady, Roberts & Co. 
holding insofar as the Court ruled that a defendant is only under a duty to 
disclose if that defendant is bound by a fiduciary duty or some similar 
relationship of trust and confidence with those to whom he might owe 
this duty.28  If this special relationship does not exist, the defendant owes 
no duty to disclose the information and can trade or tip with impunity.  
Plaintiffs, including the SEC and the United States government, have 
faced considerable difficulty in certain cases overcoming this 
relationship requirement, thereby frustrating enforcement efforts.  This 
requirement in such cases can ultimately exempt trades made on inside 
information by placing the relational aspect of the equation in a 
paramount position.  In doing so, however, the broader enforcement 
agenda—leveling the playing field of the market and preventing 
profiteering from trading on inside information—is frustrated. 
The characterization of insider trading as fraud by omission has 
necessitated a finding that some relationship exists sufficient to impose 
on the trading defendant a duty to disclose.  While this construct might 
work well enough in the context of the classical theory of insider trading, 
it has frustrated enforcement efforts in the misappropriation context.  If a 
defendant misappropriates material, nonpublic information from another 
but has no relationship with the other sufficient to impose a duty to 
disclose his trading intentions, there has been no fraud.  Take the case of 
Mark Cuban.  Set aside for a moment the issue of whether Cuban’s 
agreement to maintain the confidentiality of the PIPE offering constitutes 
an obligation to refrain from using the information.  Had there been no 
agreement whatsoever and Cuban misappropriated news of the offering 
before its announcement and sold his stock, there would be absolutely no 
basis for liability.  Even though he was the largest Mamma.com 
shareholder, he had no other relationship with Mamma.com.  He owed 
no fiduciary duty to Mamma.com—he did not sit on its board or act as an 
executive officer.  Yet Cuban is an extremely experienced investor.  He 
is the majority owner of another company whose main purpose is to 
expose securities fraud.  And Cuban knew he was in possession of 
material, nonpublic information that he could not use for selling his 
stock.  But absent any “special relationship” between Cuban and 
Mamma.com, all of these facts are irrelevant.  Absent a special 
                                                     
 28. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). 
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relationship, Cuban’s failure to disclose to Mamma.com his intent to sell 
his stock did not amount to fraud because he was under no duty to 
disclose those intentions. 
Characterizing insider trading as nonfeasance demands this 
relationship exist to assert liability.  And when it does not exist, 
defendants like Cuban can fall through the cracks.29  This relationship 
requirement has created a gap in the law that allows traders to get away 
with wrongfully trading on misappropriated information.  And arguably, 
given the roles the defendants play in the corporate landscape, they 
should know that what they have done is wrong.  If insider trading is 
characterized as misfeasance, however, courts would not need to 
determine whether a special relationship exists sufficient to impose a 
duty to disclose.30  The trading defendant would be liable for his 
                                                     
 29. Professor Donna Nagy anticipated the potential enforcement problems created by the 
relationship prerequisite in the misappropriation theory as set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision 
in O’Hagan.  Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: 
A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1251 (1998).  Professor Nagy notes that 
“O’Hagan endorsed an unnecessarily restrictive misappropriation theory that will likely frustrate the 
Government’s ability in the future to pursue other, more factually complex, instances of securities 
trading based on misappropriated information.”  Id.  In so doing, O’Hagan’s restrictiveness will 
make enforcement efforts by the government against both the “non-fiduciary thief” and the “brazen 
fiduciary” much more difficult.  Id. at 1252–58.  If there is no relationship between the thief and the 
source, there may be no liability.  Id. at 1252–56.  Similarly, if the fiduciary misappropriator 
discloses his trading intentions to the source, there may likewise be no liability.  Id. at 1256–59. 
 30. In nonfeasance cases generally, absent some special relationship, “one person owes another 
no duty to take active or affirmative steps for the other’s protection.  A defendant is generally subject 
to liability for misfeasance . . . but not for nonfeasance.”  DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS 
AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 483 
(5th ed. 2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1966); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW 
OF TORTS 853 (2000).  The general rule is that “[u]nless the defendant has assumed a duty to act, or 
stands in a special relationship to the plaintiff, defendants are not liable in tort for a pure failure to 
act for the plaintiff’s benefit.”  DOBBS, supra, § 314, at 853.  Although insider trading claims are not 
negligence claims, the original construct of the claim as set forth by SEC Chairman Cary in Cady, 
Roberts & Co. implicitly identified as relevant the elements of common law deceit, as well as the 
elements of a negligence action, in determining to whom a duty to disclose might flow.  Bayne, 
supra note 24, at 95–96.  “The fact that the defendant foresees harm to a particular individual from 
his failure to act does not change the general rule.”  DOBBS, supra, § 314, at 853.  Thus, for example, 
one will not be liable to another when he fails to save her from drowning, but he will be liable for 
failing to rescue her if he was the one who pushed her into the water.  Because the defendant 
affirmatively acted, the law imposes on him a duty to protect.  While the duty to protect in the 
misfeasance–nonfeasance tort context is theoretically different from a duty not to use or profit from 
wrongfully acquired confidential information, the two are more alike in the insider trading context 
than might appear at first glance.  Professor Bayne argued that the “possessor of inside information 
has a [d]uty to [p]rotect any [s]hareholder from certain injury resultant on nondisclosure.”  David 
Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading: The Essence of the Insider’s Duty, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 315, 320 
(1992) (emphasis omitted).  As the unknowing investor is “‘wholly unprotected from the misuse of 
special information,’” the misappropriator has a duty to protect those investors by disclosing 
misappropriated information.  Bayne, supra note 24, at 88–89.  In a misfeasance context, a 
misappropriator has a similar duty to protect by way of not using misappropriated information for 
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unlawful use of the information, not his failure to disclose it.  This 
Article examines the enforcement gap created by applying the 
relationship requirement to misappropriation cases as nonfeasance, rather 
than misfeasance. 
Part II of this Article describes the evolution of courts’ treatment of 
this fiduciary, or “fiduciary-like,” requirement, which created this 
enforcement gap.  Part III identifies how this gap has manifested itself in 
recent failed insider trading enforcement efforts.  Part III discusses recent 
insider trading cases brought under the misappropriation theory in which 
no liability was imposed on the most sentient of wrongdoers because the 
courts in those cases found that no duty existed on the part of the 
wrongdoers to disclose the information to which they were privy.  The 
courts’ reliance on a fiduciary relationship or “similar relationship of 
trust and confidence”31 has allowed certain individuals to escape liability 
where, arguably, liability would have been appropriate.32  This reliance 
has led to increasingly erroneous results—results which appear 
completely at odds with the aim of the federal securities laws which 
prohibit insider trading.33  Part IV of this Article illustrates how 
classifying misappropriation claims as misfeasance would work to fill 
this gap, either as a supplemental theory of liability to the classical and 
misappropriation theories, or perhaps to supplant them both.  Part IV 
identifies how misfeasance amounts to deception necessary for an insider 
trading claim.  It also discusses how the scienter requirement is satisfied 
in this context.  Finally, it addresses the validity of a misfeasance 
characterization given the analytical compromises created by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan.34  In short, by casting 
insider trading as misfeasance, the hope is to increase predictability and 
                                                                                                                       
personal gain.  When a defendant engages in misfeasance, there is no need to identify some 
relationship or other action taken sufficient to impose that duty.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 314; DOBBS, supra, § 314, at 854. 
 31. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 32. SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2002); United States v. Cassese, 
273 F. Supp. 2d 481, 486 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). 
 33. According to the SEC, “[b]ecause insider trading undermines investor confidence in the 
fairness and integrity of the securities markets, the SEC has treated the detection and prosecution of 
insider trading violations as one of its enforcement priorities.”  Insider Trading, U.S. SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).  
As a result, the SEC has instituted a massive and sweeping program to seek civil or criminal liability 
for almost any suspected insider trading and would desire to impose liability on every violator of the 
insider trading laws.  Thomas C. Newkirk & Melissa A. Robertson, Speech by SEC Staff: Insider 
Trading—A U.S. Perspective (Sept. 19, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/ 
spch221.htm. 
 34. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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uniformity in these cases from an analytical standpoint.  Moreover, 
classifying insider trading as misfeasance may increase the reluctance of 
either the fiduciary misappropriator, who discloses his trading intentions 
to the source, or the converter of information, who has no relationship to 
the source,35 from taking others’ confidential information and using it for 
their own personal benefit, thereby benefitting the broader enforcement 
agenda. 
II. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OR “SIMILAR RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND 
CONFIDENCE” REQUIREMENT AND THE CREATION OF THE 
ENFORCEMENT GAP: CADY, ROBERTS & CO. AND ITS PROGENY 
Rule 10b-5 was drafted in 1942 after the SEC received a report that 
the president of a company was making pessimistic public statements 
about the company.36  As shareholders dumped their stock due to the 
negative information, he bought the stock at a price lower than it 
otherwise would have been but for his statements.37  The SEC sought to 
attack this transaction as a violation of the securities laws, so it drafted 
Rule 10b-5.38  After very little discussion other than a comment by SEC 
Commissioner Sumner Pike—“‘Well,’ he said, ‘we are against fraud, 
aren’t we?’”—Rule 10b-5 was adopted.39  Although Rule 10b-5 does not 
specifically address insider trading per se, it does prohibit fraud in the 
context of buying or selling any security.40 
Much of the complexity with which the misappropriation theory is 
fraught has its origins in the administrative decision in Cady, Roberts & 
Co.41  In its decision, the SEC discussed not only the duties of an 
outsider turned constructive insider42 but also laid the foundation for the 
requirement of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and 
                                                     
 35. Professor Nagy identified the likely culprits who would slip through the cracks as the 
“brazen fiduciary” and the “non-fiduciary thief.”  Nagy, supra note 29, at 1252, 1256. 
 36. See Milton V. Freeman, ‘Insider Trading’ v. ‘Unfair Use,’ NAT’L L.J., June 13, 1983, at 15, 
15. 
 37. See id.; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 n.32 (1976). 
 38. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212 n.32. 
 39. See LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 821 (3d ed. 1983) (quoting 
Milton V. Freeman, General Discussion, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 
22 BUS. LAW. 793, 921–23 (1967)); see also Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212–13 n.32. 
 40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 41. Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
 42. According to the SEC’s opinion, certain groups have “a special relationship with a company 
and are privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in securities.”  Id. 
at 912.  Such groups include a company’s accountants, bankers or lawyers.  Id. 
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confidence.  The Cady, Roberts & Co. decision first highlighted the fact 
that insiders have an obligation to disclose material facts, “which are 
known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to 
persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their 
investment judgment.”43  However, as section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
relate to “any person,” this obligation will be imposed on noninsiders as 
well, assuming two principal elements are met: (1) a relationship that 
affords access to corporate information and (2) the inherent unfairness 
that exists when such person takes advantage of the information knowing 
it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.44  Thus, the SEC 
found that Gintel, a securities broker, violated section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 when he sold shares of Curtiss-Wright Corp. held in his 
customers’ discretionary accounts after being informed by a director of 
Curtiss-Wright—who was also a member of Gintel’s firm—that Curtiss-
Wright intended to declare a dividend to its stockholders at a reduced 
amount than prior dividend distributions.45  As a result, members of the 
buying public were harmed when they bought shares of Curtiss-Wright 
without knowing the dividend to be paid on those shares would be less 
per share than it had been in the past.46 
The SEC reasoned that because Gintel was privy to confidential 
information before Curtiss-Wright made it public, he should bear the 
same obligation of disclosure as an insider would.47  The court reasoned 
that Gintel’s violation of Rule 10b-5 extended a remedy to members of 
the investing public, as well as existing stockholders.48  Because the 
federal securities laws exist to protect the buying public from the misuse 
of confidential information, the court deemed liability appropriate.49  
Thus, the SEC’s interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was that 
anyone privy to private corporate information, either directly or 
indirectly, had an obligation to any member of the investing public either 
                                                     
 43. Id. at 911. 
 44. Id. at 912.  The SEC further reasoned: 
In considering these elements under the broad language of the anti-fraud provisions we 
are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications.  Thus, our task 
here is to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and 
privy to its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. 
Intimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited. 
Id. 
 45. Id. at 910–12. 
 46. See id. at 913 (holding that Gintel’s conduct constituted fraud or deceit upon the purchasers 
of the stocks). 
 47. Id. at 912. 
 48. See id. at 913–14. 
 49. Id. 
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to disclose such information before purchasing or selling securities of the 
company or simply abstain from engaging in the transaction.50  This has 
become known as the “disclose or abstain” rule. 
Until Chiarella was decided, the SEC and the Second Circuit 
imposed this duty to disclose on anyone in possession of material, 
nonpublic information.51  For example, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co., the Second Circuit interpreted the language from the SEC’s Cady, 
Roberts & Co. decision to impose this obligation on “anyone” as dictated 
by section 10(b).52  The court identified Rule 10b-5 as implementing the 
Congressional objective of providing all investors “equal access to the 
rewards of participation in securities transactions.”53 
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own 
account in the securities of a corporation has “access, directly or 
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone” may not take 
“advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with 
whom he is dealing,” i.e., the investing public.54 
Indeed, the Second Circuit relied on its equal access rationale from 
Texas Gulf Sulphur in upholding Vincent Chiarella’s conviction in 
United States v. Chiarella.55  The Second Circuit reasoned that “[a]nyone 
corporate insider or not who regularly receives material nonpublic 
information may not use that information to trade in securities without 
incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.”56  Thus, the court imposed an 
obligation to disclose based on the individual’s access to information.  
Yet the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States rejected the 
imposition of a duty upon anyone who possesses material, nonpublic 
information to all market participants.57  Instead, the Supreme Court held 
that fraud exists by nondisclosure only when a fiduciary relationship  
                                                     
 50. Id. at 912. 
 51. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 
1974) (imposing a duty to disclose or abstain on both tippers and tippees on the basis of the equal 
access rule); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 1969); Investors 
Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267, 44 SEC Docket 633 (imposing liability against 
outsiders who had reason to know they possessed nonpublic information). 
 52. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 53. Id. at 851–52. 
 54. Id. at 848 (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC Docket at 912). 
 55. 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 56. Id. 
 57. 445 U.S. 222, 231–33 (1980). 
APOLINSKY FINAL 3/16/2011  1:20:03 PM 
502 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
exists between the two parties or a similar relationship of trust and 
confidence.58 
Vincent Chiarella was a “markup man” at a financial printer.59  He 
helped prepare documentation relating to the takeover of five different 
companies.60  Although the identities of the companies were concealed 
by blanks or false names, he was able to determine their true identities 
before the final printing of the documents, at which time the actual 
names would be inserted.61  Without disclosing this knowledge to 
anyone, Chiarella purchased stock in each of the five takeover targets 
and sold the stock immediately after public announcement of the 
takeovers, realizing a profit of roughly $30,000.62 
The issue before the Court was the legal effect of Chiarella’s silence; 
in other words, when does one have a duty to disclose material, 
nonpublic information?63  The Court began its analysis by recognizing 
the relationship emphasized in Cady, Roberts & Co., which gives rise to 
a duty to disclose by an outsider: one which affords access to material 
information.64  The Court, however, lapsed into a discussion emphasizing 
that the  
duty to disclose arises when one party has information “that the other 
[party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar 
relation of trust and confidence between” . . . the shareholders of a 
corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential 
information by reason of their position with that corporation.65 
The Court then analyzed whether Chiarella had a duty to disclose the 
information he learned but did so in the context of the duty imposed on 
insiders of a corporation—a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust 
and confidence to the shareholders of the company.66  In other words, 
while the Cady, Roberts & Co. decision emphasized a relationship that 
affords the outsider access to confidential company information, the 
Court in Chiarella emphasized the relationship between the trader and  
                                                     
 58. Id. at 230. 
 59. Id. at 224. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 226. 
 64. Id. at 226–27. 
 65. Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). 
 66. Id. at 232–33. 
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the company’s shareholders and whether any fiduciary-type duties exist 
inherent in that relationship.67 
The Court determined that no duty to disclose existed by virtue of 
Chiarella’s relationship with the shareholders of the target companies 
because, in effect, he had no relationship with them; he had no prior 
dealings with them and was not their agent or fiduciary.68  Rather, he 
simply was a stranger.69  To find a duty to disclose existed, the Court 
reasoned that it would have to recognize a general duty between all 
market participants to abstain from transactions on the basis of material, 
nonpublic information.70  This was one of the bases upon which the 
Court rejected the equal access theory recognized in Texas Gulf 
Sulphur.71  The other ground for rejection was that not every instance of 
financial unfairness is fraudulent.72  In other words, the Court recognized 
that although certain buyers and sellers may have an unfair advantage 
over less informed investors, that alone does not amount to fraud.73  
Thus, Chiarella found that “[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon 
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.”74  The 
Court held “that a duty to disclose under section 10(b) does not arise 
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.”75 
This portion of the opinion sets the stage for the inevitable 
enforcement gap we experience today.  First, the Court made no 
distinction between corporate insiders and outsiders.  It is difficult to 
conceive of a situation where a true outsider (as opposed to an outsider 
determined to be a “constructive” insider) would owe a duty to disclose 
confidential information to a corporation’s shareholders before trading 
on the basis of that information.  Stemming from that obstacle, the Court 
failed to appreciate any middle ground between a fiduciary duty on the 
one hand and a general duty among all market participants on the other, 
such as the standard set forth by the SEC in its Cady, Roberts & Co. 
decision.  As a result, the Court’s rationale constructed significant 
boundaries for enforcement of insider trading claims against anyone 
                                                     
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 232. 
 70. Id. at 233. 
 71. Id. at 229; see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654–55 (1983) (rejecting the equal access, 
or parity of information theory, instead reiterating a fiduciary or similar relationship requirement). 
 72. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 235. 
 75. Id. 
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other than a true insider because of its focus on the fraudulent 
omission—one for which a duty to disclose needs to be imposed under 
only the proper circumstances.  The Court refused to impose this duty on 
all market participants.  Rather, a particular relationship must exist to 
impose it.  Finally, although the Court failed to decide the validity of the 
misappropriation theory, for it determined it was not properly presented 
to the jury, its fiduciary relationship requirement became the analytical 
building block of the misappropriation analysis in United States v. 
O’Hagan.76 
After twenty or more years of debate among the lower federal 
courts,77 the Supreme Court finally legitimized the misappropriation 
theory in O’Hagan.78  There, the Court determined that O’Hagan, a 
partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, violated section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 by trading on material, nonpublic information he had gained 
from his law firm.79  The firm was representing Grand Metropolitan PLC 
in its tender offer bid for all of the common stock of Pillsbury 
Company.80  O’Hagan was not involved in the transaction but learned of 
it through his firm’s representation of Grand Metropolitan.81  Before 
public announcement of the tender offer, O’Hagan purchased 5000 
shares of Pillsbury’s common stock, as well as 2500 call options for 
Pillsbury stock, which gave him the right to purchase additional shares of 
Pillsbury stock for a specified price.82  When Grand Metropolitan 
announced its tender offer, the price of Pillsbury’s stock rose to almost 
sixty dollars per share.83  O’Hagan then sold his stock and the call 
options, making a profit of more than $4.3 million.84  Because O’Hagan 
was not a corporate insider at Pillsbury, the government prosecuted him 
under the misappropriation theory.85  The Court determined that 
O’Hagan owed his law firm a duty of trust and confidence; as such, his 
trading in Pillsbury securities without disclosing his trading intentions to 
                                                     
 76. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 77. Compare United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 613 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 642, 
and United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943–44 (4th Cir. 1995), abrogated by O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 
642, with SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1991), SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 442 (9th 
Cir. 1990), and SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 78. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650. 
 79. Id. at 646–49. 
 80. Id. at 647. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 648. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 653 n.5. 
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the firm constituted a deceptive device in contravention of section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.86  O’Hagan “feign[ed] fidelity” to his firm while 
furthering his own pecuniary gain with the information he 
misappropriated from the firm.87 
Although O’Hagan broadens liability to a certain extent by capturing 
outsiders with disclosure obligations to the source of the misappropriated 
information, later cases reveal that the relationship requirement O’Hagan 
inherited from Chiarella allows certain wrongdoers to fall through its 
net.88  By focusing on whether a sufficient relationship exists to impose a 
duty to disclose, courts are forced to ignore the fact that these defendants 
knowingly traded on material, nonpublic information89—in other words, 
that they unlawfully used another’s proprietary information for their own 
pecuniary gain.  These individuals negatively affect investors and the 
policy behind the securities laws just as surely as those with a 
relationship sufficient to impose a duty.  It is this use of the confidential 
information that threatens those policy concerns and not merely the fact 
that one has some special relationship that requires disclosure. 
When an individual actively does something “wrong,” as opposed to 
failing to do the “right” thing, that individual has engaged in 
misfeasance.  Once the individual has harmed others by active 
commission of a wrong, a duty is said to exist.90  In the case of insider 
trading, this duty would be a duty to refrain from using or profiting from 
another’s confidential information. 
III. RECENT FAILED ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AS A RESULT OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT 
Recent insider trading cases involving the misappropriation theory of 
liability have highlighted that the current standard—based on a fiduciary 
duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence—by which courts 
base liability for nondisclosure is unworkable.  In each of the following 
cases, although the courts determined no duty existed and, therefore, no 
violation of section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 occurred, the defendants were 
                                                     
 86. Id. at 652–54. 
 87. Id. at 653, 655. 
 88. See infra Part III. 
 89. See discussion infra Part III. 
 90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1966).  An exception to this rule exists when 
public policy dictates the contrary result, for example, in deciding whether a mother owes her 
unborn child a duty not to smoke or drink while pregnant.  See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 30, § 289, at 
787–88. 
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individuals who, because of their positions, or expertise, or both, should 
be aware of the prohibitions against trading in violation of the securities 
laws.91  These cases fit within certain themes.  On the one hand, some 
courts reject the existence of any fiduciary relationship—and thus reject 
Rule 10b-5 liability—by relying on the characteristics set forth in United 
States v. Chestman as necessary to assert such a relationship: 
“superiority, dominance, or control.”92  On the other hand, some courts 
have determined that even though some hallmarks of a relationship exist, 
such as an obligation of confidentiality, those characteristics are 
insufficient to give rise to a duty to disclose.93  The district court’s 
decision in SEC v. Cuban, discussed above, is an example of such a 
case.94 
Although the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s 
dismissal of the SEC’s claim, it did not provide any greater clarity to the 
issue of whether Cuban owed Mamma.com a duty to disclose his trading 
intentions or abstain from trading.  The court reasoned that Cuban’s 
statement—“Well, now I’m screwed.  I can’t sell.”—plus his follow-up 
conversation with the sales representative for the PIPE to get pricing 
information provide a plausible basis that an understanding existed 
between Cuban and Mamma.com’s CEO that Cuban would not trade on 
the confidential information learned.95  Yet their collective understanding 
is irrelevant to the question of whether Cuban owed Mamma.com a 
duty.96  Although parties’ expectations of confidentiality can be relevant 
to the determination of a duty,97 in Cuban the parties’ understandings 
should play no part in that determination.  Per Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), Cuban 
agreed to maintain the information in confidence.98  That alone should 
                                                     
 91. See SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Cassese, 273 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Kim, 184 F. 
Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 92. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).  The Second Circuit in Chestman set forth guidelines for 
determining what constitutes a similar relationship of trust and confidence.  Id. at 568.  The 
relationship at issue must be the “functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship” and thus requires 
“‘reliance, and de facto control and dominance.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 
108, 125 (2d Cir. 1982)).  The fiduciary relationship “‘exists when confidence is reposed on one side 
and there is resulting superiority and influence on the other.’”  Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (Cir. Ct. 1972), rev’d, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1975)). 
 93. See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 727–28 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 
remanded, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 94. As in Cuban, courts also question the validity or applicability of Rule 10b5-2 to a particular 
set of facts.  See, e.g., Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 1061–64. 
 95. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 557–58. 
 96. Id. at 558. 
 97. See, e.g., SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 98. Cuban, 620 F.3d at 555. 
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suffice to impose a duty on him.  Rule 10b5-2 clearly states that “‘a duty 
of trust or confidence’ exists” whenever a person has so agreed to 
maintain that confidence.99  If the agreement exists, the duty exists 
sufficient to require one to disclose or abstain. 
A. United States v. Kim 
In United States v. Kim, Keith Joon Kim, CEO of Granny Goose 
Foods, Inc., purchased shares of Meridian Data, Inc. stock after learning 
that Meridian was involved in merger negotiations with a company 
called Quantum Corp.100  Kim was a member of the regional forum of the 
Young Presidents Organization (YPO), an organization for company 
presidents under fifty years old, as was the CEO of Meridian.101  The 
forum members left March 1, 1999, for their annual retreat, but the CEO 
of Meridian could not attend the retreat due to the merger negotiations 
and authorized the moderator to tell the other members why he could not 
attend.102  He also asked the moderator to stress to the other members 
that the information was confidential.103  Between March 1 and March 4, 
1999, Kim purchased 187,300 shares of Meridian stock.104  On March 
11, 1999, Meridian publicly announced it had agreed to be acquired by 
Quantum, and Kim realized a significant profit on his investment.105 
The government prosecuted Kim under the misappropriation theory 
of insider trading, that one violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “‘when 
he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading 
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.’”106  
Thus, the court was confronted with the issue of whether a fiduciary 
relationship or a similar relationship of trust and confidence existed 
between Kim and the members of the forum such that a “legal duty of 
confidentiality” existed, a violation of which would give rise to 
liability.107  Because the parties agreed that no fiduciary relationship 
existed between Kim and the forum members, the court analyzed 
                                                     
 99. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2010).  Unfortunately, the court declined to address the force 
of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) or its validity. 
 100. 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1008–09 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 101. Id. at 1008. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1008–09. 
 105. Id. at 1009. 
 106. Id. (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997)). 
 107. Id. 
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whether a similar relationship of trust and confidence existed.108  Using 
the rationale set forth in United States v. Chestman,109 the court in Kim 
concluded that the government failed to allege facts establishing 
superiority, dominance, and control among Kim and the members of the 
YPO.110  As a result, although Kim misappropriated confidential 
information from the YPO and its members, he owed no duty to any of 
them to disclose his trading intentions, notwithstanding the emphasis 
placed on the confidentiality of the merger.111  Thus, Kim could not be 
held liable under the misappropriation theory.112 
B. United States v. Cassese 
United States v. Cassese is another example where Chestman 
characteristics played a critical role.113  There, Compuware Corp. sent a 
confidentiality agreement to John Cassese, Chairman and President of 
Computer Horizons Corp., in connection with the potential acquisition of 
Computer Horizons by Compuware.114  The confidentiality agreement 
prohibited any Computer Horizons employee from trading securities 
based on any material, nonpublic information learned in the ongoing 
acquisition negotiations.115  However, neither Cassese nor anyone else at 
Computer Horizons ever signed the agreement.116  Compuware 
ultimately decided not to acquire Computer Horizons.117  Karmanos, 
Compuware’s CEO, telephoned Cassese and advised him that 
Compuware had decided to acquire a company called Data Processing 
Resources Corp. (DPRC) instead of Computer Horizons and, as Cassese 
knew, Compuware had not yet publicly announced the acquisition.118  
The next day, Cassese purchased 15,000 shares of DPRC at $13.25 per 
share.119  Immediately following public announcement of the DPRC 
acquisition, Cassese sold his DPRC stock for $23.31 a share, yielding a 
                                                     
 108. Id. at 1010. 
 109. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 110. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1011–12.  The Second Circuit in Chestman set forth guidelines for 
determining what constitutes a similar relationship of trust and confidence.  See supra note 92. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 273 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 114. Id. at 483. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 484. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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profit of roughly $151,000.120  But because the court determined no 
relationship existed between Cassese and Karmanos sufficient to impose 
a duty on Cassese to disclose his trading intentions to Karmanos, the 
court granted Cassese’s motion to dismiss.121  Like the court in Kim, the 
court in Cassese relied on characteristics set forth in Chestman for 
determining whether a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship exists: 
dominance, disparate knowledge and skill, and confidence reposed by 
one side with resulting superiority and influence of the other.122 
C. SEC v. Talbot 
Similarly, a court also found J. Thomas Talbot not to have breached 
a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence when he 
purchased 10,000 shares of LendingTree after learning of a potential 
acquisition of LendingTree while at a Fidelity board meeting.123  Here, 
however, the court did not rely on Chestman in making its determination.  
Instead, the court examined the relationship between Talbot and the 
source more generally, finding the relationship insufficient to justify any 
fiduciary analysis.  Talbot sat on the board of Fidelity National Financial, 
Inc.—a public company whose stock trades on the New York Stock 
Exchange.124  LendingTree’s CEO notified Fidelity’s Executive Vice 
President that a third party might acquire LendingTree and asked 
whether Fidelity would be interested in making an offer to purchase 
LendingTree.125  At the time of this disclosure, Fidelity owned a small 
percentage of LendingTree stock.126  Shortly thereafter, Fidelity held its 
quarterly board of directors meeting, which Talbot attended.127  Toward 
the end of the meeting, Fidelity’s CEO and Chairman, William Foley, 
told the board of LendingTree’s potential acquisition by a third party and 
stated that Fidelity would likely benefit if the acquisition was 
consummated.128  Two days after the board meeting, on April 24, 2003, 
Talbot bought 5000 shares of LendingTree stock.129  On April 30, 2003, 
                                                     
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 486–88. 
 122. Id. at 486–87. 
 123. SEC v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d, 530 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 124. Id. at 1032. 
 125. Id. at 1033. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1034. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1035. 
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Talbot purchased an additional 5000 shares.130  On May 5, 2003, 
LendingTree’s acquisition was made public, and Talbot subsequently 
sold his 10,000 shares, realizing a profit of roughly $68,000.131 
The court determined that Fidelity, not Foley or LendingTree, was 
the source of the information.132  The court needed to ascertain who the 
“source” was to determine whether Talbot breached a duty to that 
source.133  Certainly Talbot, as a Fidelity director, owed a duty to 
Fidelity.  General duties notwithstanding, Talbot argued that he owed no 
duty to Fidelity to maintain the confidentiality of the LendingTree 
acquisition assuming Fidelity could have traded on the LendingTree 
information without violating the securities laws.134  In other words, “if 
Fidelity could have traded on the LendingTree information without 
incurring liability under the securities laws, ‘it would be incongruous to 
find that [he] breached a duty to Fidelity because he received the . . . 
information from . . . Fidelity’ and traded on it.”135  Because Fidelity was 
a shareholder of LendingTree, Fidelity did not owe a fiduciary duty of 
confidentiality to LendingTree; rather, the duty was owed to Fidelity.136  
And Fidelity did not owe LendingTree a similar relationship of trust and 
confidence.137  As a result, Talbot could not be held liable for insider 
trading under the misappropriation theory.138 
Talbot illustrates the circuitous problem created by the fiduciary, or 
fiduciary-like, relationship that must exist for misappropriation theory 
liability.  Quite rightly, the court determined that Fidelity owed no 
fiduciary duties to LendingTree.  Yet, notwithstanding the lack of any 
duty to LendingTree, it is patently wrong to suggest that Fidelity should 
be able to trade in LendingTree stock after having been told information 
regarding a pending LendingTree acquisition in confidence.  Why should 
Fidelity be allowed to profit from such undisclosed information?  
Moreover, to suggest a board member can buy or sell stock based on 
                                                     
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1048–49.  Talbot unsuccessfully argued that Foley was the source of the information 
and that he was acting outside the scope of his agency for the company when he disclosed the 
potential acquisition to the Fidelity board.  Id. at 1048.  The court rejected this argument because 
communicating information regarding Fidelity’s investments and advising the Fidelity board of an 
event that might impact the company were acts taken within the scope of Foley’s agency.  Id. 
 133. Id. at 1046. 
 134. Id. at 1049. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1051. 
 137. Id. at 1064. 
 138. Id. 
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confidential information learned at a board meeting without any 
securities laws repercussions is inappropriate as well. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court, relying 
on the fact that Talbot’s duty to Fidelity alone sufficed to give rise to 
liability.139  The decision provided meaningful clarity to the existence of 
a legal duty, insofar as that duty need not be a continuous chain of duties 
from the originating source, here LendingTree, to the misappropriator.140  
Notwithstanding this clarity, the case does little for truly determining the 
existence of a duty in a misappropriation context since the board 
member—company relationship is such an obvious example of one that 
dictates fiduciary obligations.141 
D. Courts That Have Reached the Opposite Result 
Some courts, however, have held the opposite of those in the cases 
discussed above, sometimes on almost identical facts.  For example, in 
SEC v. Kirch, the court held that Kirch violated the securities laws when 
he sold his ShowCase Corp. stock after learning that ShowCase would 
not make its quarterly earnings projections.142  Kirch learned this 
information at a meeting of the CEO Roundtable, a group of key officers 
of computer software companies that met twice a year to exchange 
sometimes confidential information about their business and 
companies.143  The Roundtable members had an express policy that they 
would keep any matters discussed at their meetings confidential.144  
Kirch sold his stock despite the confidentiality policy and despite being 
told the information regarding ShowCase was confidential.145  The court 
held that the relationship of the Roundtable members and the recognition 
                                                     
 139. SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 140. Id. at 1093. 
 141. Moreover, the court’s opinion confused another required element of a Rule 10b-5 claim 
when it connected the meaning of “confidential” information with the materiality of the information.  
Id. at 1095–96.  As a matter of law, confidential information is information that is not public.  Id. at 
1095 (citing Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1046 (Del. Ch. 2004)).  Yet the court 
associated the confidentiality of the information with the likelihood the transaction at issue would 
occur and the magnitude of that event.  Id. at 1097; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
238 (1988) (holding that the materiality of speculative events is determined by balancing of both the 
indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of 
the totality of the company activity).  The confidentiality of information on the one hand, and its 
materiality on the other, should be kept distinct from one another. 
 142. 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 143. Id. at 1147. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1148. 
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that the ShowCase information was confidential called for application of 
the misappropriation theory.146  This result is in stark contrast to the 
decision reached in Kim.  The court rather blithely rejected the 
defendant’s reliance on Kim, stating that it believed the “express 
confidentiality constraints call for application of the ‘misappropriation 
theory’ here.”147  While the court in Kim placed significant importance 
on what it considered to be the hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship—
dominance and control—the court in Kirch believed the expectation of 
confidentiality sufficed. 
Similarly, in SEC v. Kornman, the court held Kornman violated the 
securities laws when he traded in the securities of both MiniMed Inc. and 
Hollywood Casino Corp. after learning that each of those companies was 
to be acquired.148  Kornman learned this information after either he or his 
associates met with executives from those companies to discuss 
potentially engaging Kornman’s company, The Heritage Organization 
L.L.C., for personal tax advice as a result of the acquisitions.149  
Although it was Heritage’s policy to draft a post-meeting memorandum 
containing a confidentiality clause, it appears no confidentiality 
agreement was signed by any party to these discussions.150  Regardless of 
the lack of an executed confidentiality agreement, the court held that 
Kornman’s “superior knowledge as to the subject matter of tax and 
estate-planning . . . serve[d] as an indicator that a duty of trust and 
confidence had developed between [him] and the two executives.”151  
Thus, the court relied on Chestman-type characteristics of superiority or 
dominance in determining a duty did in fact exist.152 
These cases are troubling for a number of reasons.  First, contrasting 
results in factually similar cases are discouraging.  In light of the 
seriousness with which the SEC advances its enforcement efforts in this 
area, the need for consistency and uniformity is palpable.  Second, while 
the defendants who escaped liability have not broken the law per se, the 
wrongfulness of what they did is clear.  The individuals in each of the 
preceding cases hold high-ranking positions in well-developed 
                                                     
 146. Id. at 1150. 
 147. Id. at 1150–51. 
 148. 391 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480–82 (N.D. Tex. 2005). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 478–80. 
 151. Id. at 489.  The court relied in large part on the language from Chestman requiring 
relationships characterized by superiority, dominance, or control and found these criteria existed in 
Kornman.  Id. at 488–89. 
 152. Id. at 487–88. 
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businesses, which suggests they know or should know the implications 
of their actions.  But they got lucky in the face of the analytical 
gymnastics engaged in by these courts when determining whether a duty 
exists sufficient to hold them liable for their actions.  Each court 
attempted to determine what obligations these individuals owed the 
relevant source of the information; and if the relationships between the 
parties yielded no obligation to maintain confidentiality or disclose 
trading intentions, then the misappropriators have defrauded no one.  
While these cases demonstrate that courts wrestle with questions of 
whether certain expectations exist based on the kind of relationship the 
parties have, the opinions have created a lack of consistency.  While 
some of these cases rely on evidence of superiority and dominance as 
between one party to the other, others rely on the expectations of the 
parties, who may not be unequal to each other.  Moreover, the mere fact 
that a source exists does not make it any easier to determine whether a 
duty to that source exists.  This difficulty yields enforcement disparities 
regarding what should be uniformly applied federal law. 
Is there a way to close this gap in an analytically appropriate manner 
that follows a textual reading of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5?  As 
described below, characterizing insider trading as a wrong by 
commission, as opposed to one of omission, appears to do exactly that.  
The question taken up in the next Part is whether improper trading alone, 
absent any relationship conferring a duty, is sufficient to establish the 
requisite fraud necessary for Rule 10b-5 liability.  Because the 
misappropriation theory relies on “feigning fidelity” to the source by not 
disclosing one’s trading intentions as its requisite deception, perhaps an 
alternate theory, based on something other than nondisclosure, can serve 
as the basis for liability in other contexts. 
IV. INSIDER TRADING AS MISFEASANCE 
A. Analytical Framework of the Misappropriation Claim 
Insider trading liability is premised upon a violation of section 10(b) 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934153 and Rule 10b-5.154  
Section 10(b) prohibits the use of any manipulative or deceptive device  
                                                     
 153. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 154. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
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or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.155  
Rule 10b-5 provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . .  
 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or] . . .  
 . . . .  
 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.156 
Courts have interpreted a “manipulative” device or contrivance to 
mean something used to manipulate the securities markets generally, 
“such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended 
to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”157  A 
“deceptive” device has been identified as either a misrepresentation of 
material fact or an omission thereof.158  Recognition of those concepts as 
the only manipulative or deceptive devices helped categorize insider 
trading as an omission claim.159  Indeed, the Supreme Court, in its 
decision in United States v. Chiarella, refused to extend the term 
deception beyond a misrepresentation or a duty to disclose, holding: 
“When an allegation of fraud is based upon disclosure, there can be no 
fraud absent a duty to speak . . . premised upon a duty to disclose arising 
from a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties to a 
                                                     
 155. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.  Section 10(b) specifically provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . .  
  . . . . 
  (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors. 
Id. 
 156. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 157. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977); see also Daniel A. McLaughlin, 
Liability Under Rules 10b-5(a) & (c), 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 631, 636 (2006) (“[C]ourts have followed 
this definition of ‘manipulative’ as referring to similar types of artificial market activity (i.e., the 
execution of securities transactions designed to simulate genuine interest in buying or selling at an 
artificial price).”). 
 158. See Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 475–76. 
 159. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235, 230 (1980); McLaughlin, supra note 157, 
at 636–37 (noting that the Court in Chiarella refused to extend the concept of deception beyond 
misrepresentations or omissions). 
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transaction.”160  Because the courts had identified those as the only 
relevant manipulative or deceptive devices, insider trading needed to fit 
within that rubric.  Under the “classical” theory of insider trading 
liability, when a corporate insider trades in his company’s securities on 
the basis of the company’s material, nonpublic information, without 
disclosing the information first to shareholders, that trading qualifies as a 
“deceptive device” under the statute.161  Because the insider has a 
fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of the company, he must 
disclose the information to the shareholders before purchasing or selling 
shares of the company on the basis thereof. 162  Thus, if he purchases or 
sells securities without disclosing the relevant information to the 
shareholders, he has deceived or defrauded them because he has failed to 
disclose when under a duty to do so.  Otherwise, the insider would be 
allowed to take advantage of the uninformed shareholder for his own 
personal gain.163 
The requisite deception occurs under the misappropriation theory 
when “outsiders” of the corporation misappropriate a company’s 
“confidential information for securities trading purposes . . . in breach of 
a duty owed to the source of the information,”164 rather than to the 
shareholders of the company.  Thus, liability will be imposed when an 
outsider learns of material, nonpublic information from a “source” to 
whom he owes a duty—for example, his own employer—and fails to 
disclose to that source that he intends to trade on the basis of the 
information.165  He has a duty to disclose his trading intentions to the 
source, the entity from whom he misappropriated the information.166 
The underlying rationale of the misappropriation theory is that a person 
who receives secret business information from another because of an 
established relationship of trust and confidence between them has a 
duty to keep that information confidential.  By breaching that duty and 
appropriating the confidential information for his own advantage, the 
fiduciary is defrauding the confider who was entitled to rely on the 
fiduciary’s tacit representation of confidentiality.167 
                                                     
 160. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235, 230. 
 161. See id. at 227–28; United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997). 
 162. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–29. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 165. See id. at 652–54. 
 166. See id. at 652–55. 
 167. United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 274 (S.D.N.Y 1990). 
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In essence, the deception occurs because the misappropriator–trader 
should have been more loyal to the source but was not. 
B. Rejection of Omission as the Basis for an Insider Trading Claim 
1. Stoneridge and Its Acknowledgment that Conduct Violates Rule 
10b-5 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s earlier pronouncements that 
manipulations of the market, misrepresentations, or omissions are the 
only viable means to establish a Rule 10b-5 claim, it altered course 
somewhat in its decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc.168  In the context of whether a scheme to defraud could 
provide the basis for Rule 10b-5 liability, the Court made clear that 
conduct—in addition to a misrepresentation or omission—may also 
violate section 10(b).169  This assertion is extremely important in an 
insider trading context.  It presents an opportunity to frame an insider 
trading claim as something other than an omission for which a duty to 
disclose must exist.  In other words, it could allow for characterization of 
insider trading as misfeasance—the unlawful use of material, nonpublic 
information.  This standard is very different from what the Court in 
Chiarella insisted was necessary for Rule 10b-5 liability—that because 
insider trading was fraud based on nondisclosure (nonfeasance), it is 
actionable only when there exists a duty to speak.  If an insider trading 
claim can be revisited in the context of actionable conduct, the possibility 
exists to frame the claim as one of misfeasance—the unlawful use of 
information for one’s own personal benefit. 
2. The Waning Fiduciary Relationship 
Another development which lends credence to insider trading as 
misfeasance is the waning importance of the fiduciary relationship, both 
in the corporate context generally, as well as in the insider trading 
context.170  It has been recently argued that, to the extent insiders owe 
                                                     
 168. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 169. See id. at 158 (stating that conduct can also be deceptive and thus violate section 10(b)); 
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (stating that 
section 10(b) prohibits not only the making of a misstatement or omission but also the commission 
of a manipulative act). 
 170. See Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 258–59 
(2009); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA 
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any fiduciary duties, they do not owe them to shareholders, but rather to 
the corporation, however that entity is defined.171  The belief that 
directors and executive officers owe shareholders fiduciary duties, and 
duties of disclosure specifically, stems from the traditional view that 
shareholders own the corporation due to initial capital contributions and 
their status as residual claimants.172  This assertion necessarily implies 
that the insiders would not owe such duties to other investors such as 
creditors.173  Yet in many instances, capital provided by creditors 
constitutes a significant portion of the capitalization in a particular 
corporation.174  Unsurprisingly, the creditors have protected themselves 
and their capital by contractually requiring certain obligations from 
insiders.175  Thus, an emerging idea is that the historical view of fiduciary 
obligations owed to shareholders should give way to negotiated 
obligations in a contractual setting.176  Taking the idea that corporate 
insiders might not owe shareholders a fiduciary duty would support the 
                                                                                                                       
L. REV. 1315, 1340–52 (2009). 
 171. See Alces, supra note 170, at 245–48; Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other 
People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309, 1310–13, 1333 (2008); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. 
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 300–01 (1999). 
 172. See Alces, supra note 170, at 247.  Yet at the same time, the board does many things that 
favor creditors and other investors at the expense of shareholders, like, for example, filing a 
bankruptcy petition.  Baird & Henderson, supra note 171, at 1316.  Other examples include 
structuring a merger to eliminate shareholder vote, removing rights of appraisal, and buying out 
minority shareholders at the request of a majority shareholder.  Id. at 1317–18. 
 173. Baird & Henderson, supra note 171, at 1333.  Professor Alces observes: 
All of those facts about the state of shareholders’ relationship to management . . . conflict 
with traditional understandings of enforceable fiduciary duties.  For example, a 
beneficiary of fiduciary duties can hold the fiduciary liable for preferring the interests of 
others above his own and can require that the fiduciary not act contrary to the 
beneficiary’s interests at all, particularly not for the benefit of a party to whom fiduciary 
duties are not owed. 
Alces, supra note 170, at 246. 
 174. See Baird & Henderson, supra note 171, at 1310–11. 
 175. See id. at 1311. 
 176. Alces, supra note 170, at 258–59; Baird & Henderson, supra note 171, at 1333–42.  
Professor Alces notes: 
If we acknowledge that shareholders are not beneficiaries of particular fiduciary duties 
and question whether they are really “owners” of a firm, then we must see that we have 
moved beyond the traditional understanding of corporate fiduciary duties.  Directors are 
not fiduciaries of the shareholders.  While what is good for the residual claim is often 
good for corporate wealth maximization, common goals alone do not give rise to a 
fiduciary relationship.  Fiduciary relationships require a clear beneficiary who can 
enforce certain obligations of loyalty, that is, a beneficiary who can insist that its interests 
are preferred above all others and are the singular focus of the fiduciary’s efforts on the 
beneficiary’s behalf.  In our ever-changing and increasingly complex corporate world, 
directors and officers simply do not act “on behalf” of shareholders.  Rather, their duty, to 
the extent fiduciary, seems to be owed to the corporation. 
Alces, supra note 170, at 247. 
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idea that liability for insider trading is not properly established atop that 
foundation.177 
Moreover, recent history has witnessed a shift away from strict 
adherence to relationships which qualify as fiduciary, or fiduciary-like, 
in the insider trading context.  As discussed above, the Court in Chiarella 
identified “‘a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence’” 
as the necessary relationship that must exist to impose a duty to 
disclose.178  While a fiduciary relationship may be simple to define, 
courts have endeavored to adequately define what other relationships 
might fall within these confines.179  In the context of classical insider 
trading, the Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC discussed that outsiders 
become fiduciaries to a corporation’s shareholders when they have 
entered into a “special confidential relationship” with the corporation, 
whereby they are given access to information solely for corporate 
purposes and the corporation expects the outsider to keep the information 
confidential.180  Thus, a duty to disclose would be imposed on 
underwriters, lawyers, accountants, or consultants who are legitimately 
given access to this kind of information.181 
In the misappropriation context, the focus is on the relationship 
between the misappropriator and the source of the confidential 
information, as opposed to a corporation’s shareholders.  And although 
the court in Chestman posited that “fiduciary duties are circumscribed 
with some clarity in the context of shareholder relations,” it recognized 
that they “lack definition in other contexts.”182  Against this backdrop, 
the court in Chestman set forth criteria noted above for determining 
when a relationship is fiduciary-like in nature: “‘reliance, and de facto 
control and dominance,’”183 “‘when confidence is reposed on one side 
and there is resulting superiority and influence on the other,’”184 and 
                                                     
 177. See Nagy, supra note 170, at 1320.  Professor Nagy points out that “numerous lower courts 
and the SEC have in effect concluded that the wrongful use of information constitutes the crux of the 
insider trading offense and that fiduciary principles are only relevant insofar as they establish such 
wrongful use.”  Id. 
 178. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). 
 179. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983); supra Part III. 
 180. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. 
 181. Id. 
 182. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991).  “Tethered to the field of 
shareholder relations, fiduciary obligations arise within a narrow, principled sphere.  The existence 
of fiduciary duties in other common law settings, however, is anything but clear.”  Id. 
 183. Id. at 568 (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
 184. Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfield, 339 N.Y.S. 2d 623 (Civ. Ct. 1972)). 
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“discretionary authority and dependency.”185  Thus, the court would 
require some relationship steeped in these characteristics before finding a 
similar relationship of trust and confidence existed between 
misappropriator and source.  Because the marital relationship at issue in 
Chestman did not exhibit any of these criteria, notwithstanding the fact 
the husband promised his wife he would keep the information she told 
him confidential, the court found the husband not liable for insider 
trading.186 
In response to cases like Chestman, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2 in 
2000 to provide a bright-line rule for determining when certain 
relationships create duties of trust or confidence.187  The Rule sets forth a 
nonexclusive list of situations that create these duties.188  The Rule was 
designed “to protect investors and the fairness and integrity of the 
nation’s securities markets against improper trading on the basis of inside 
information”189 and to rectify the anomalous result that a “family 
member who trades in breach of a reasonable expectation of 
                                                     
 185. Id. at 569. 
 186. Id. 
 187. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2010); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 
51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 240).  Professor Nagy notes that the change from 
the conjunctive duty of trust and confidence to the disjunctive duty of trust or confidence 
considerably extends the scope of the misappropriation theory.  Nagy, supra note 170, at 1360.  
“[T]he terms ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’ are often used synonymously to describe reliance on the 
character or ability of someone to act in a right and proper way.  But as used in Rule 10b5-2, the 
term ‘confidence’ may align more with an obligation of ‘confidentiality’ than with obligations 
predicated on trust and loyalty.”  Id.  Thus, Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), which covers situations where one 
“‘agrees to maintain information in confidence,’” removes fiduciary principles altogether.  Id. at 
1361 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1)). 
 188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b).  Subsection (b) of the Rule provides that a duty of trust or 
confidence exists: 
  (1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; 
  (2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the 
person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know 
that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the 
recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or 
  (3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or 
her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or 
obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed 
with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor 
reasonably should have known that the person who was the source of the information 
expected that the person would keep the information confidential, because of the parties’ 
history, pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there 
was no agreement or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information. 
Id. 
 189. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,729. 
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confidentiality  . . . does not necessarily violate Rule 10b-5.”190  The Rule 
retreats from the more rigid characterizations that earlier typified a 
necessary fiduciary-like relationship.  Now, for example, the imposition 
of a duty to disclose follows from an agreement of confidentiality 
between equals in an arms-length transaction191 or simply between 
family members exchanging information.  These relationships bear none 
of the hallmarks of the traditional fiduciary, or fiduciary-like, obligation 
which carried with it recognition that a fiduciary should not benefit at the 
expense of the beneficiary. 
The First Circuit’s recent decision in SEC v. Rocklage is an example 
of a case where a duty was found under Rule 10b5-2 and thus a 
corresponding waning of the importance of the fiduciary, or fiduciary-
like, relationship as a necessary prerequisite to an insider trading 
claim.192  In Rocklage, a CEO shared with his wife negative, nonpublic 
information that the company’s drug failed a clinical drug trial.193  He 
also told her that when the market heard the news, the company’s stock 
price was certain to plummet.194  Although the CEO emphasized the 
confidential nature of the information, his wife had a standing agreement 
with her brother to tell him any negative information she learned from 
her husband before it became public.195  However, before telling her 
brother, she disclosed her intentions to her husband.196  The court, 
finding the wife liable, determined that she had deceived her husband, 
notwithstanding her disclosure to her husband, by acquiring the 
information from him in the first place without telling him she had a 
standing agreement with her brother.197 
                                                     
 190. Id. 
 191. Professor Alces points out that calling a relationship “fiduciary” signals that the fiduciary is 
held to a higher standard of trust and obligation in serving the beneficiary’s interest than otherwise 
would exist.  Alces, supra note 170, at 244.  Contractual relationships, on the other hand, 
are governed by precise terms and a comparatively low standard of good faith and fair 
dealing.  There is a limit to the extent to which parties in a contractual relationship can 
take advantage of each other or their relative positions, and they are expected to try, in 
good faith, to honor their contractual obligations, but remedies for disappointing 
performance are limited by the terms of the contract and to appropriate and measurable 
damages. 
Id. 
 192. 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 193. Id. at 3. 
 194. Id. at 4. 
 195. Id. at 3–4. 
 196. Id. at 4. 
 197. Id. at 8. 
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Notwithstanding the adoption of Rule 10b5-2, the SEC is pushing—
and courts are recognizing—that fraud can exist in an insider trading 
claim without any fiduciary duty or similar relationship present.198  In 
SEC v. Dorozhko, for example, the SEC maintained that the defendant’s 
fraud consisted of his alleged computer hacking to gain access to a 
company’s earnings report, rather than any failure to disclose.199  The 
Second Circuit held in Dorozhko that none of the Supreme Court 
opinions in Chiarella, O’Hagan, or SEC v. Zandford200 requires a 
fiduciary relationship as an element of an actionable securities claim 
under section 10(b).201  While the above cases all stand for the 
proposition that nondisclosure in breach of a duty to disclose satisfies the 
deception requirement, the Second Circuit recognized that none of them 
requires such a relationship to state a claim.202  “While Chiarella, 
O’Hagan, and Zandford all dealt with fraud qua silence, an affirmative 
misrepresentation is a distinct species of fraud.”203  Although the court in 
Dorozhko acknowledged that computer hacking can be a deceptive 
device sufficient for Rule 10b-5 liability, it remanded the case to 
determine whether the hacker actually misrepresented his identity to gain 
                                                     
 198. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 2009); SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd., Exchange Act 
Release No. 20018, 90 SEC Docket 268 (Feb. 26, 2007) (awarding temporary restraining order 
against defendants from violating antifraud provisions of securities laws due to fraudulent hacking 
into companies’ computer systems and trading before announcement of those companies’ news 
releases); SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, No. 05 CV 9259, 2005 WL 3309748 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 8, 2005) (awarding injunctive relief for defendant’s fraudulent hacking into companies’ 
computer systems and trading prior to release of confidential information). 
 199. 574 F.3d at 44–45. 
 200. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).  Zandford dealt with a securities broker who 
convinced an elderly, infirm man and his mentally retarded daughter to open a joint account with 
him.  Id. at 815.  They granted him discretion to manage the account without prior approval.  Id.  He 
wrote checks and sold securities from their account and deposited the proceeds therefrom into his 
own accounts.  Id. at 815–16.  Even though the Court reasoned that the SEC’s complaint described a 
fraudulent scheme where a securities transaction and breach of fiduciary duty coincide, nowhere 
does the opinion require that a fiduciary duty exist.  See id. at 825. 
 201. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48–50.  The court held that the defendant computer hacker, who was 
neither a corporate insider nor had a special relationship with the source of the information, may 
have committed fraud, notwithstanding the lack of a duty to disclose, because computer hacking is 
deceptive.  Id. at 51.  The court remanded to determine whether the hacker actually misrepresented 
his identity to gain access or simply stole the information.  Id.  How he gained access would 
determine whether he actually engaged in a deceptive act.  Id. 
 202. Id. at 49. 
 203. Id.  The SEC argued that the “defendant affirmatively misrepresented himself in order to 
gain access to material, nonpublic information, which he then used to trade.”  Id.  Thus, the SEC 
relied not on deception based on nondisclosure but, rather, on deception because of a 
misrepresentation, because the hacker “‘engage[d] in false identification and masquerade[d] as 
another user.’”  Id. at 51. 
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access or simply stole the information.204  Determining precisely how he 
gained access would establish whether he actually engaged in a deceptive 
act.205 
These developments in the evolution of insider trading law are 
accretional.  While none of these developments alone establishes a 
changed perspective, taken in the aggregate, the picture becomes clear 
that the fiduciary relationship is no longer the sine qua non of insider 
trading liability—other kinds of relationships implicate the broader 
policies of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Thus, it makes less and less 
sense to base a misappropriation claim on this fiduciary bedrock, when 
the bedrock itself is being chipped away.  If fiduciary duties do not exist 
between insiders and shareholders, it becomes very difficult to suggest 
that some relationship evidencing an obligation must exist before an 
outsider can be held liable. 
3. Unlawful Use of Another’s Information as Deception 
As discussed above, to fit within the confines of section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, courts have characterized insider trading as an omission.  
The deception necessary to state a claim concerns the trader’s failure to 
disclose in violation of a disclosure obligation.  This obligation requires a 
fiduciary relationship or some other relationship under which this 
obligation would flow or be created.  Characterizing insider trading in 
this manner, particularly under the misappropriation theory, has led to 
instances of nonliability where this relationship prerequisite was found 
not to exist.  However, in many, if not all of these cases, the traders in 
question knowingly and wrongfully took and used another’s material, 
nonpublic information for their own personal gain.206  So although they 
may not have been under any duty to disclose their trading intentions, 
their use of the information was inherently unlawful.  Courts have been 
forced to ignore these instances of wrongful acquisition and use in the 
absence of an obligation to disclose trading intentions or keep 
information confidential.207  To recognize this unlawful use of 
information as deception would take the insider trading claim out of the 
realm of an omission and attendant duty and place it in the context of an 
active commission, or misfeasance, where no relationship need exist to 
                                                     
 204. Id. 
 205. Id.  
 206. See supra Part III. 
 207. See supra Part III. 
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satisfy a disclosure obligation.  My proposal that insider trading be 
treated as misfeasance should not be misunderstood as suggesting that 
insider trading submit to a negligence construct.  Indeed, the rule 
requires fraud, and a plaintiff must prove, fraud.208  Rather, eliminating 
the focus of insider trading as a claim of omission and focusing instead 
on the wrongful use of misappropriated information allows courts to find 
liability in appropriate situations without having to struggle to find the 
existence of a special relationship which would give rise to a duty to 
disclose. 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stoneridge, courts 
need not confine insider trading claims to nondisclosure claims.  Indeed, 
courts have recognized this and have attempted to move beyond 
Chiarella’s dictates to find acts of deception independent of a failure to 
disclose.209  In Rocklage, the deceit did not involve failure to disclose in 
breach of a duty, but rather the wife’s act of intentionally eliciting 
confidential information from her husband while fully intending to share 
the information with her brother.210  It follows from the Rocklage court’s 
attempt to reconcile the illogicality of O’Hagan—allowing a fiduciary to 
disclose trading intentions to the source and thereby elude liability—that 
the Rocklage court is disavowing the necessity of the fiduciary 
relationship in the first place.  Rather, the means by which the wife 
elicited the information furnished the requisite deceit, not any 
nondisclosure. 
Similarly, courts in a variety of computer hacking cases, such as 
Dorozhko, have concentrated on the manner in which the defendants 
gained access to information about securities issuers.211  These cases 
focus on the way in which information is obtained, as opposed to the 
relationship between the parties involved.212  One scholar has suggested 
that this “deceptive acquisition” of confidential information should 
become the basis for liability under the misappropriation theory.213  As 
Professor Nagy notes, the court in Rocklage started to “embrace a new 
theory premised on the deceptive acquisition of confidential 
information, . . . but . . . failed to make clear that a theory of deceptive 
                                                     
 208. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 209. See, e.g., SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 210. Id. 
 211. 574 F.3d 42, 49–51 (2d Cir. 2009); SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 
20018, 90 SEC Docket 268 (Feb. 26, 2007); SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, Exchange Act 
Release No. 19450, 86 SEC Docket 1591 (Nov. 1, 2005). 
 212. See sources cited supra note 198. 
 213. Nagy, supra note 170, at 1369–73. 
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acquisition is analytically distinct from the misappropriation theory 
endorsed in O’Hagan.”214  Even if it had, deceptive acquisition by itself 
would not catch the next Mark Cuban or J. Thomas Talbot, individuals 
who legitimately obtained the information in the first place and then 
traded.  Moreover, deceit in the acquisition of information is largely 
irrelevant unless the information is used for trading.215  Thus, the use to 
which the information is put becomes increasingly more important.  Still, 
the question looms, is the unlawful use of another’s confidential 
information deceptive? 
To answer this question, Chiarella is instructive.  The starting point 
for the Supreme Court in Chiarella was the legal effect of Vincent 
Chiarella’s silence.216  The Court’s adherence to the language in Cady, 
Roberts & Co.—that, due to the fiduciary duty insiders owe to 
shareholders, they are under a duty to either disclose or abstain—created 
the box within which later insider trading cases must fit.217  
Characterizing these cases as involving the effect of one’s silence 
necessarily established an insider trading claim as one where silence 
cannot be fraudulent unless one is under a duty to speak.218  And the 
Court refused to extend this duty to the market generally.219  The Court’s 
rejection of a duty to all market participants originated from its 
concurrent rejection that all market participants are entitled to equal 
access to market information.220  In turn, the Court’s rejection of the 
“parity of information” or “equal access” theory stemmed from its 
concern that recognition of such a theory would presumably impose on 
anyone with information a duty to disclose it to the investing public.221  
But again, this rejection originates from the characterization of insider 
trading as nondisclosure.222  As made clear above, the deception 
                                                     
 214. Id. at 1369. 
 215. See, SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 553–55 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that use of deceit to 
obtain information to use in the purchase or sale of securities is illegal). 
 216. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980). 
 217. Id. at 226–27. 
 218. Id. at 230. 
 219. Id. at 233. 
 220. Id. at 233–34. 
 221. Id. at 234–35. 
 222. Id. at 236.  The Court stated, “We hold that a duty to disclose . . . does not arise from the 
mere possession of nonpublic market information.”  Id. at 235. 
The Court of Appeals said that its ‘regular access to market information’ test would 
create a workable rule embracing ‘those who occupy . . . strategic places in the market 
mechanism.’  These considerations are insufficient to support a duty to disclose.  A duty 
arises from the relationship between parties . . . not merely from one’s ability to acquire 
information because of his position in the market. 
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necessary to state a claim under section 10(b) has not been so 
circumscribed.223  Thus, using misappropriated information could 
thereby create liability, not because a duty to disclose has been imposed 
but because use of the information is deceptive in and of itself. 
Even in its Chiarella decision, the Supreme Court recognized ways 
in which fraud can exist by virtue of other extant duties when outsiders 
profit on material, nonpublic information.224  The Court noted, for 
example, that tippees have a “duty not to profit from the use of inside 
information that they know is confidential and know or should know 
came from a corporate insider.”225  This example shows precisely how a 
misfeasance characterization is feasible.  Justice Blackmun, in his 
dissenting opinion in Chiarella, recognized such fraud as a basis for 
liability.  The mere fact that Chiarella stole information that he then used 
to make money  
offers certainly . . . the most dramatic evidence that petitioner was 
guilty of fraud. . . . even if he had obtained the blessing of his 
employer’s principals before embarking on his profiteering scheme. . . . 
[P]etitioner’s brand of manipulative trading, with or without such 
approval, lies close to the heart of what the securities laws are intended 
to prohibit.226 
Chief Justice Burger also argued in his dissent that the general rule of 
nondisclosure in an arm’s length transaction should “give way when an 
informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, 
foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means.”227  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Brennan agreed with Chief Justice Burger, stating that “a 
person violates [section] 10(b) whenever he improperly obtains or 
converts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he then uses in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.”228  These Justices 
                                                                                                                       
Id. at 232 n.14 (citation omitted); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647 (1983) (noting that “[t]he 
SEC’s position that a tippee who knowingly receives nonpublic material information from an insider 
invariably has a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading rests on the erroneous theory that the 
antifraud provisions require equal information among all traders.  A duty to disclose arises from the 
relationship between parties and not merely from one’s ability to acquire information because of his 
position in the market”). 
 223. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008). 
 224. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
 225. Id. at 230 n.12.  Presumably, a tippee’s duty not to profit is derivative of his duty to disclose 
the insiders or misappropriators who also tip in breach of their duties.  The language used by the 
Court is certainly instructive in framing deception in the absence of fiduciary underpinnings. 
 226. Id. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 227. Id. at 239–40 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 228. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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embraced a “fraud on the investors” misappropriation theory, which 
suggests that “[i]nsider trading is wrong because it violates a general 
duty each person owes not to trade on misappropriated material 
nonpublic information.  If a person trades securities on the basis of such 
information—even with someone to whom he owes no fiduciary duty—
he commits securities fraud.”229 
Building on these opinions in Chiarella, leading commentators have 
argued that a misappropriator of material, nonpublic information has a 
duty to disclose that information to investors before investing.230  
Professor Nagy suggests that a duty to disclose exists not merely under a 
fiduciary construct but also when one party has superior knowledge or 
special facts that the other party cannot obtain.231  This may be 
particularly true when one with superior knowledge or special facts has 
obtained them through wrongful or illegal actions.232  Professors Strudler 
and Orts argue in a similar vein and do so from a deontological 
perspective.233  That is, if you use material, nonpublic information that 
you have no right to use and your doing so will put other investors at an 
informational disadvantage, from a moral perspective you have wronged 
that other person.234  Based on this reasoning, your failure to disclose is 
securities fraud.235  The suggestion here is similar but different in a 
critical way—use of misappropriated information does not necessarily 
give rise to a duty to disclose for which failure to disclose would be 
fraudulent.  Rather, use of misappropriated information is by itself 
fraudulent. 
At its most basic level, wrongful use of material, nonpublic 
information is simply an extension, or perhaps a simplification, of the 
continuing evolution of the fiduciary requirement by the courts and the 
SEC.236  In other words, nondisclosure in breach of an obligation to 
                                                     
 229. Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 375, 395 (1999). 
 230. See Nagy, supra note 29, at 1287–88; Strudler & Orts, supra note 229, at 399. 
 231. Nagy, supra note 29, at 1289. 
 232. Id. at 1289–90. 
 233. See Strudler & Orts, supra note 229, at 408–21 (discussing the moral implications of 
gaining “an informational advantage by luck as compared to effort, skill, or intelligence”). 
 234. Id. at 419. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Nagy, supra note 170, at 1319. 
  Despite the Supreme Court’s explicit dictate that fiduciary principles underlie the 
offense of insider trading, there have been recent repeated instances in which lower 
federal courts and the [SEC] have disregarded these principles. . . . 
. . . The SEC likewise ignored fiduciary principles in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1).  That rule 
extends liability under the misappropriation theory to securities transactions based on 
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disclose is effectively an acknowledgement that the misappropriator has 
not been as loyal as the source would have expected him to be.  The 
source is led to believe his information is safe and being used 
appropriately.  Yet when someone takes the source’s information and 
uses it for his own personal benefit, has that source not been “duped” just 
as surely as if the source had a relationship with the person who 
exploited the information for his own gain? 
Consider the ramifications of Rule 10b5-2 on this idea.  Has one 
really been defrauded in the traditional sense when a misappropriator 
trades in breach of a contractual obligation with him?  Has a mother been 
defrauded when her son fails to keep information she told him in 
confidence?  She might be angry or embarrassed, but has she been 
defrauded?  Did she have an expectation of loyalty such as a traditional 
fiduciary or similar relationship might create?  As the source’s 
expectations of loyalty continue to retreat, the deception necessary for an 
insider trading claim looks more like wrongful use of information. 
Notably, Rule 10b5-2 focuses not on the source’s expectations of 
“loyalty” or confidentiality directly but on the misappropriator’s 
expectations as to the source: Did the person receiving the confidential 
information know or should he reasonably have known that the source 
expected that person to keep the information confidential?  Although the 
source may not have any true expectation of confidentiality because of 
his relationship with the misappropriator, the misappropriator knew or 
should reasonably have known the source expected him to keep the 
information confidential, regardless of the kind of relationship they have.  
This trend in expectations also becomes important in defining the limits 
of liability for wrongful use as deception.237  As the fiduciary 
requirement gets increasingly watered down, nondisclosure as fraud 
loses a certain amount of its prior credibility—not because nondisclosure 
in breach of a duty is no longer deceptive but because the expectation of 
loyalty created by the relevant relationship has been increasingly diluted.  
When the expectation of loyalty becomes so diminished such that no 
“traditional” duty exists, the mere use of confidential information, absent 
any fiduciary-like relationship between the source and the 
misappropriator, should suffice as deception, much like Rule 10b5-2 
                                                                                                                       
information subject to a confidentiality agreement, regardless of the nature of the 
relationship between the trader and the information’s source.  Both SEC rules, however, 
are consistent with the view that insider trading involves the wrongful use of material 
nonpublic information regardless of the presence of a fiduciary-like duty. 
Id. at 1319–20. 
 237. See infra Part IV.B.5. 
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dictates.  The trader has perpetuated a false reality that the source’s 
information will be safe and used appropriately.  By using the 
information for personal financial gain, the trader has unlawfully profited 
at the expense of the source, as well as the shareholders.  This weakening 
fiduciary requirement and expectation of loyalty allows for consideration 
of the use of misappropriated information as deception because the ideas 
effectively amount to the same thing: a lack of any true expectation of 
confidentiality in a traditional fiduciary sense looks a lot like simply 
taking another’s information and using it for one’s own personal gain. 
This concept of taking and using another’s property right to 
confidential information as satisfying the section 10(b) deception 
requirement has some teeth in Supreme Court insider trading 
jurisprudence.  Consider the Supreme Court’s discussion in Carpenter v. 
United States of the deception requirement in the mail fraud statute.238  
The mail fraud statute prohibits using the mail for “any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises.”239  While the mail 
fraud statute and section 10(b) apply to different statutory violations, the 
deceptive conduct underlying both claims is often the same.240  Claims 
for violations of the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are generally 
brought alongside securities fraud claims; yet as in section 10(b), 
Congress provided no precise definition in the mail fraud statute for what 
constitutes fraud or a deceptive device.  Both the district court and court 
                                                     
 238. 484 U.S. 19, 22 (1987). 
 239. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).  The mail fraud statute provides: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or 
furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, 
or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such 
counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or 
attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, 
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or 
causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private 
or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, 
or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction 
thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is 
addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 20 years, or both.  If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit 
authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a 
presidentially declared major disaster or emergency . . . or affects a financial institution, 
such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 
years, or both. 
Id. 
 240. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 677–78 (1997) (discussing the 
interconnectedness of the facts giving rise to a mail fraud claim and a securities fraud claim). 
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of appeals in Carpenter determined that Winans, a reporter for the Wall 
Street Journal, “knowingly breached a duty of confidentiality by 
misappropriating prepublication information regarding the timing and 
contents of the ‘Heard’ column, information that had been gained in the 
course of his employment. . . . It was this appropriation of confidential 
information that underlay both the securities laws and mail and wire 
fraud counts.”241  As a result of this deception, those courts found 
Winans guilty of violating both section 10(b), as well as the mail and 
wire fraud statutes.242  Since the Supreme Court was evenly divided with 
regard to the insider trading convictions, it affirmed the Second Circuit’s 
judgment.243  With regard to the mail fraud convictions, the Court 
reasoned that Winans defrauded the Wall Street Journal of its property 
rights to its confidential business information.244 
Both courts below expressly referred to the Journal’s interest in the 
confidentiality of the contents and timing of the “Heard” column as a 
property right, . . . and we agree with that conclusion.  Confidential 
business information has long been recognized as property. . . . We 
cannot accept petitioners’ further argument that Winans’ conduct in 
revealing prepublication information was no more than a violation of 
workplace rules and did not amount to fraudulent activity that is 
proscribed by the mail fraud statute.  [The mail fraud and wire fraud 
statutes] reach any scheme to deprive another of money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. . . . 
[T]he words “to defraud” in the mail fraud statute have the “common 
understanding” of “wronging one in his property rights by dishonest 
methods or schemes,” and “usually signify the deprivation of 
something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.”245 
Although Winans worked for the Wall Street Journal and as an agent 
owed it a duty of confidentiality, the Court’s language strengthens the 
argument that deception can occur by depriving another of his property 
right in his confidential information.246  If the deception underlying a 
                                                     
 241. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23–24. 
 242. Id. at 24–25. 
 243. Id. at 24.  The Second Circuit reasoned that misappropriation theory liability can arise not 
only when the misappropriator owes a duty of confidentiality to the corporations whose securities 
were traded but also when the misappropriator owes this duty to his employer whose securities were 
not traded.  United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1028–30 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 244. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25. 
 245. Id. at 25–27 (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987)) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 246. Id. at 26–27; see also Randall W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading 
in the Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865, 894–95 (2003) (discussing how a computer hacker could be liable 
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mail fraud and an insider trading claim is the same conduct, the meaning 
ascribed to deceptive behavior sufficient to satisfy a claim under each 
should warrant consistent interpretation.247  And the Court’s 
interpretation of deception under the mail fraud statute would encompass 
using another’s misappropriated information. 
Yet it has been argued that “stealing”—as misappropriation of 
confidential information has been called—does not amount to fraud,248 
and there is little judicial authority to support the idea.249  If someone 
steals your car from a parking lot, you likely have not been defrauded.  
But if stolen information is used to gain an informational advantage over 
others who do not possess the same information, the conversion of that 
information looks less like garden-variety stealing and more like 
deception.  Certainly there is a “deprivation of something of value by 
trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.”250  The source is deceived as to 
the security of its information, and investors are deceived as to the equal 
footing upon which they invest.251  In fact, this “unfair informational 
advantage” is what the court in Rocklage identified in eradicating the 
fiduciary relationship requirement.252  Rocklage and the computer 
hacking cases, such as Dorozhko, illustrate well this concept of stealing 
as fraud. 
Although the courts’ rulings in those cases have not necessarily 
always favored the SEC’s position, the SEC appears to be bringing these 
                                                                                                                       
for theft of confidential information). 
 247. See Quinn, supra note 246, at 874–75.  Quinn discusses how the deception sufficient in 
Carpenter to satisfy a mail fraud violation “made clear the validity of a key component of the 
misappropriation theory—stealing information from one’s employer might, under certain 
circumstances, constitute deception.”  Id.  Although the mail fraud statute simply requires deception, 
“not fraud ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities” like Rule 10b-5 requires, O’Hagan 
clarified that a misappropriator’s fraud is consummated, not when he gains the confidential 
information, but when he uses it in a securities transaction.  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
655–56 (1997).  Thus, the deceptive conduct sufficient to give rise to a mail fraud claim gives rise to 
a securities fraud claim when it is used “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities. 
 248. See Bayne, supra note 24, at 144–45; Nagy, supra note 29, at 1255; Saikrishna Prakash, 
Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1526–27 (1999); Quinn, 
supra note 246, at 894–95. 
 249. See infra notes 252–57 and accompanying text. 
 250. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27. 
 251. Certainly not every investor has the same information upon which to make securities 
purchases or sales.  The distinction here, however, is driven by the unlawful misappropriation of 
information, rather than legitimate informational advantages attained by “research or . . . derived 
from publicly available information.”  Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider 
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 883 (2010). 
 252. SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 6, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2006).  For a discussion on the blurring of 
fairness and equality and how that blurring plays out in the insider trading context, see Craig W. 
Davis, Comment, Misappropriators, Tippees and the Intent-to-Benefit Rule: What We Can Still 
Learn from Cady, Roberts, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 263, 284–90 (2004). 
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kinds of cases with more frequency.  One commentator has argued, 
however, that the rationale—like that in Dorozhko—allowing hacking as 
deception so long as there has been misrepresentation, leads to uneven 
results: a thief who misrepresents his identity to obtain the confidential 
information deceives the source of that information, but the thief who 
does not use a false identity or some other form of deception to gain 
access does not.253  Yet if both trade, only the imposter-thief is liable, but 
both trades have equally harmed investors.254  Certainly this is true if 
deception of the source is necessary for liability.255  But as discussed 
above, where one trades on another’s information, investors may also be 
deceived as to the levelness of the playing field upon which they trade.  
Moreover, this theory suggests that a misrepresentation is necessary for 
the theft to qualify as deception.  Per the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Stoneridge, if Rule 10b-5 prohibits deceptive conduct, “courts need to 
look to the functional impact of the conduct.  Therefore, if an outsider 
wrongfully obtains information with the scienter or intent to trade 
required by section 10(b), this should be covered by Rule 10b-5.”256  This 
argument should not fall victim to the dictates of Chiarella—that 
something more than knowing use of nonpublic information is necessary 
for Rule 10b-5 liability.  Instead, this contention focuses on active 
commission of a wrong—a wrong premised upon the unlawful use of 
another’s information and not on imposing a duty in the context of 
nonaction.  Indeed as one commentator has noted, 
given courts’ expansion of the misappropriation theory from a narrow 
version in O’Hagan to the endorsement of the broader liability in Rule 
10b5-2, Rocklage’s removal of the fiduciary requirement, and the 
reinvigoration of the version of the misappropriation theory originally 
outlined in the Chiarella dissent, one is left with the inescapable 
conclusion that mere thieves are liable for insider trading under Rule 
10b-5.257 
                                                     
 253. Hazen, supra note 251, at 902. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See infra Part IV.B.4. for a discussion of deception of investors versus deception of the 
source. 
 256. Hazen, supra note 251, at 902. 
 257. Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 608 (2008). 
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4. Resolution of O’Hagan’s Analytical Inconsistencies Using 
Misfeasance Deception 
Some of the analytical inconsistencies created by the 
misappropriation theory may also be resolved if unlawful use could 
suffice as deception.  For example, because nondisclosure serves as the 
basis for the deception in a misappropriation claim, if the 
misappropriator discloses his trading intentions to the source, O’Hagan 
makes clear there has been no deception and thus no securities 
violation.258  However, the animating force behind the securities laws—
protection of investors, promoting investor confidence, and protecting 
the integrity of the markets—is not furthered when a misappropriator can 
escape liability by disclosing his trading intentions to the source.259  The 
shareholders have still suffered harm notwithstanding the lack of 
deceptive conduct.260  By connecting the deceptive conduct to the 
wrongful use of misappropriated information, the deception has been 
delinked from disclosure.  More importantly, the deception has a more 
appropriate analytical leg to stand on than it does when disclosure 
permits trading, at least insofar as advancing policy considerations of the 
securities laws. 
Another inconsistency O’Hagan established is the fact that although 
the source has been defrauded by the misappropriator’s nondisclosure, 
the source will typically have no standing to sue for securities fraud 
because it is neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities.261  The 
shareholders, however, none of whom have been deceived, do have a 
right of action.262  While asserting use as deception would not necessarily 
change the standing of the source, the source becomes a lot less relevant 
in determining the existence of deception because the relationship 
between the source and the misappropriator may no longer serve as the 
basis for the deception.  Thus, a claim with misappropriation-like facts 
                                                     
 258. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654–55 (1997). 
 259. See id.; Nagy, supra note 29, at 1273. 
 260. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656; Nagy, supra note 29, at 1273, 1276. 
 261. Nagy, supra note 29, at 1285–87. 
 262. In Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., the court recognized this analytical contradiction and thus 
held that investors were not defrauded because no duty was owed to them.  719 F.2d 5, 23 (2d Cir. 
1983).  Congress remedied that result when it adopted section 20A of the Exchange Act, which 
provides private plaintiffs with express standing to sue any individual who violates any provision of 
the Exchange Act by trading in securities while in possession of material, nonpublic information.  
Nagy, supra note 29, at 1283–85.  Although section 20A assists private plaintiffs in remedying their 
claims, it does not assist the government or the SEC when bringing a misappropriation claim.  See 
id. 
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would have a more plausible underpinning upon which to base 
liability.263 
One additional compromise created by O’Hagan is the very concern 
outlined in the Introduction to this Article: converters of another’s 
information who are not fiduciaries or who do not fall under any of the 
three scenarios set forth in rule 10b5-2, who then wrongfully use that 
information for their personal gain, can tip or trade with no repercussions 
under the securities laws.264  As described above, this problem was 
created by characterizing insider trading as an omission.  Thus, the 
deception is the failure to disclose but only if the trader is under an 
obligation to disclose.  Because there appeared to be no option for insider 
trading other than to fit within the omission rubric, the misappropriation 
theory had to do the same.  Unfortunately, the absence of any 
relationship obligating the misappropriator to disclose his trading 
intentions eliminates liability for stealing another’s information and 
trading on it.  Conversely, the misfeasance scenario laid out here would 
allow for liability. 
                                                     
 263. One commentator has made a similar argument, albeit based on a different theoretical 
underpinning.  M. Breen Haire, Note, The Uneasy Doctrinal Compromise of the Misappropriation 
Theory of Insider Trading Liability, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251, 1283–84 (1998).  For the 
misappropriation theory to be plausible under section 10(b), the breach of duty to the source of the 
information, rather than the subsequent improper trading, must be the evil the statute was intended to 
prevent.  Id. at 1283.  If this is true, the result should be the “elimination of both private rights of 
action . . . and secondary liability for employers in misappropriation theory cases.”  Id.  As a result, 
the Court should “acknowledge that its endorsement of the misappropriation theory was tantamount 
to an endorsement of the equal access doctrine, and take the dubious step of recognizing a duty 
among all shareholders to disclose nonpublic information.”  Id. at 1284. 
 264. While Rule 10b5-2 is certainly a helpful tool in successful misappropriation litigation, it 
probably does not go far enough to solve the problem outlined here.  First, Rule 10b5-2’s importance 
derives from its relation to deception as nondisclosure because the Rule identifies scenarios where 
duties of trust or confidence exist.  Second, the SEC has met challenges with regard to how courts 
interpret the language of Rule 10b5-2.  For example, in SEC v. Cuban, the District Court determined 
that although Mark Cuban agreed to keep the information confidential, the rule did not impose on 
him an obligation to refrain from trading or otherwise using the information.  634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 
730–31 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, remanded, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).  And unfortunately on 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit declined to rule on Rule 10b5-2’s applicability to the case or its validity in 
general.  Cuban, 620 F.3d at 558.  Moreover, it is unclear whether Rule 10b5-2 would have 
permitted liability in cases such as United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002), and 
SEC v. Kirch, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (N.D. Ill. 2003).  In both cases, there is a rather indirect 
expectation of confidentiality, and no agreement was signed or explicit promise of confidentiality 
made.  Thus, it is not clear Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) would apply.  Moreover, although Kim and Kirch 
were members of groups that may have routinely shared confidences, if the specific parties at issue 
had never shared confidences at these meetings, would Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) cover that scenario?  The 
court in Kim did not directly rule on the validity of Rule 10b5-2 because it was adopted after the 
defendant’s trading took place, but it did question whether the Rule would apply to the facts.  184 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1014–15. 
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Yet allowing liability for trading on misappropriated information, 
absent any special relationship, begs the question whether liability should 
exist anytime one acquires material, nonpublic information and trades on 
it.  This question hearkens back to the earlier days of insider trading 
jurisprudence when the Court rejected the so-called equal access theory 
acknowledged earlier by certain courts.265  The Court rejected this theory 
because it was loathe to impose a duty to disclose upon anyone who was 
in possession of confidential information.266  It is not necessary, 
however, to owe the investor a duty in order to harm him by trading on 
information to which the investor has no access.  Deception as 
misfeasance would avoid that problem; a court would not have to impose 
a duty because the wrongdoer has committed an act of active 
misfeasance—unlawful trading. 
Notwithstanding this distinction, however, certain limits on liability 
should exist.  Anyone bringing a misappropriation claim should be able 
to establish deception by any plausible means.  Yet if “deceptive use”—
meaning the act of trading on another’s information—is sufficient to 
satisfy a claim, does this deceit pick up more potential defendants than is 
appropriate?  Would it catch the person who finds confidential 
information on a bus that someone has unknowingly dropped?  Would it 
catch the person who overhears a conversation in a restaurant regarding 
sensitive corporate information?  If it does, should it?  The next Section 
attempts to craft limits so as to constrain unrestrained liability. 
5. Crafting the Limits of Liability 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and SEC rulemaking to date advise 
against allowing liability to exist at these margins identified above.  But 
the state of current law and the judicial machinations courts are forced to 
devise under the misappropriation theory dictate that SEC or 
congressional rulemaking is appropriate for clarification of the many 
constructions of misappropriation liability with an eye toward closing the 
enforcement gap. 
The SEC could create another stand-alone rule, much like it did 
when it adopted Rule 14e-3, which identifies deceptive conduct in a 
tender offer context without relying on any fiduciary construct.267  Rule 
                                                     
 265. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980). 
 266. See id. at 233. 
 267. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2010).  Rule 14e-3(a) provides: 
  (a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has 
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14e-3 effectively creates strict liability for one who trades while in 
possession of material, nonpublic information regarding a tender offer, 
regardless of whether any fiduciary duty or similar relationship exists 
between the source of that information and the trader.268  A rule such as 
this in the Rule 10b-5 context would, however, create liability at the 
margins which may not be appropriate.  Alternatively, the SEC could 
adopt another subsection within Rule 10b-5 that defines what conduct is 
deceptive in a misappropriation context to relieve the courts from having 
to make this determination.269  Finally, Congress could amend section 
10(b) to provide meaningful guidance.  “[G]iven Section 10(b)’s 
ambiguity and unpredictability—and the resulting circuit splits—as the 
judiciary traversed the tortuous path of interpreting insider trading 
regulations, legislative action could set more definite contours of the 
Rule’s liability.”270 
Congress had the opportunity to do so during the 1980s but instead 
enhanced the penalties for insider trading without explicitly defining the 
requisite conduct sufficient for liability.271  A proposed bill during that 
time, Senate Bill 1380, actually identified the use of wrongfully obtained 
information as grounds for insider trading liability.272  Senate Bill 1380 
made it unlawful: 
                                                                                                                       
commenced, a tender offer (the “offering person”), it shall constitute a fraudulent, 
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act 
for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender 
offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he 
knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from: 
  (1) The offering person, 
  (2) The issuer of securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or 
  (3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of 
the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or caused to be purchased or sold 
any of such securities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such 
securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, 
unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its 
source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise. 
Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See Steinbuch, supra note 257, at 609–11 (discussing the options the SEC has for clarifying 
the insider trading rules). 
 270. Id. at 611. 
 271. Nagy, supra note 170, at 1366–67. 
 272. Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987, S. 1380, 100th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (1st Sess. 1987). 
For the purpose of this section, information shall have been used or obtained wrongfully 
only if it has been obtained by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, theft, 
conversion, misappropriation or a breach of any fiduciary, contractual, employment, 
personal or other relationship of trust and confidence. 
Id. 
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for any person, directly or indirectly, to use material, non public 
information to purchase or sell any security . . . if such person knows or 
is reckless in not knowing that such information has been obtained 
wrongfully, or if the purchase or sale of such security would constitute 
a wrongful use of such information.273 
This Bill, had it been enacted, would have gone a long way toward 
closing the enforcement gap that currently exists.  It appears to reject 
liability for those who casually overhear or fortuitously happen upon 
confidential information.274  At the same time, it alleviates the need (in 
most instances) to determine whether a fiduciary duty or similar 
relationship of trust and confidence existed before misappropriation 
liability is appropriate.275  Moreover, the Bill does not distinguish 
between thieves who misrepresent their identity and those who do not.276  
The rule is premised upon equal access to information not by virtue of a 
duty imposed on those with the information to disclose it to those who do 
not but rather inequality as to access as a means of deception.277  It trains 
on active commission of a wrong as deception—trading on another’s 
information.278 
What this rule may not address is when the trader’s acquisition of the 
information was by purely lawful means, as in such cases as Kim, Talbot, 
or Cassese, as opposed to unlawful acquisition of information.  This 
question turns on what misappropriation really means.  For example, 
does misappropriation connote unlawfully obtaining another’s 
confidential information, or does it simply mean using another’s 
information, whether lawfully obtained or not?  This distinction is 
critical to balanced closure of the gap currently created by the 
misappropriation theory.  Thus, any rule should clearly define the 
parameters of what constitutes misappropriated information.  It should 
focus not solely on the use of unlawfully obtained information but also 
on the use of someone else’s information, whether lawfully or unlawfully 
                                                     
 273. Id. 
 274. Id.  To more clearly reject liability for such individuals, a rule could focus on the 
expectations of confidentiality of the source of the information.  In other words, if one is discussing 
confidential information over lunch in a crowded restaurant or leaves confidential papers lying 
around that others could easily find and use, then the source has little to no expectation of 
confidentiality.  Contrast this with the expectation of confidentiality an employer would have when 
discussing confidential information in the office with other coworkers.  Arguably, the employer 
should have a greater expectation of confidentiality there than in a public place with outsiders. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id. 
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obtained, provided the trader knows or recklessly disregards the fact that 
the purchase or sale is a wrongful use of the information.  Such a rule 
would closely track the Bill’s language.279 
Assuming liability at the margins is undesirable, a rule would have to 
address this concern as well.  In contrast to the expectations of the trader 
in Rule 10b5-2, the expectations of the source of the information are 
important here to avoid such liability.  In other words, one should have 
no expectation of confidentiality when discussing confidential 
information in a public place.  Nor should one have an expectation of 
confidentiality when one accidentally leaves papers containing 
confidential information in a public place.  Put differently, there should 
be no deception of the source when the source has no expectation the 
information will not be used.  A more nuanced distinction must be made, 
however, as to deception of investors in this context.  Arguably, the 
playing field upon which they invest is still not level given another’s 
access to confidential information.  Perhaps any fortuitous, accidental 
acquisition of confidential information might be deemed a legitimate 
informational advantage, particularly because there is no “‘deprivation of 
something of value by trick, deceit, chicane, or overreaching.’”280  Any 
meaningful clarity Congress or the SEC could bring to the insider trading 
laws would increase consistency of judicial decision-making, would 
enhance investor protection and integrity of the markets, and would 
create a coherent approach to insider trading liability. 
6. Does Scienter Exist in the Misfeasance Context? 
Scienter has long been an element of an insider trading claim.281  
Scienter is “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.”282  Although the pleading requirement for scienter has 
undergone considerable debate,283 the substantive standard for scienter 
                                                     
 279. See id. 
 280. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 
U.S. 350, 358 (1987)). 
 281. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 282. Id. at 193 n.12. 
 283. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) was enacted by Congress to provide 
a check against abusive securities fraud litigation by private parties.  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2007) (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006)).  Section 
21D(b)(2) of the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).  
Congress, however, left the term strong inference undefined, and courts of appeals were divided as 
to its meaning until the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314.  In Tellabs, the 
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itself has remained unchanged.  Every circuit court that has considered 
the issue has determined that scienter may be established by a showing of 
intent to deceive or recklessness, and the Supreme Court has not yet 
ruled on that issue.284  If the requirement for deception is met by the use 
of another’s information so long as “such person knows (or recklessly 
disregards) that such information has been obtained wrongfully, or that 
such purchase or sale would constitute a wrongful use of such 
information,”285 it necessarily follows that scienter exists as well.  Courts 
have looked to opportunistic timing of trades once the trader becomes 
aware of the confidential information to satisfy an allegation of 
scienter,286 as well as whether the defendant knew the information was 
unlawfully obtained.287  Thus, it appears that under a misfeasance 
construct, both the deception and scienter requirements necessary to state 
a claim would exist. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mark Cuban escaped liability in the district court because his 
relationship with Mamma.com was insufficient to establish a duty to 
disclose.  Moreover, the agreement he made with Mamma.com’s CEO to 
keep the information regarding the proposed PIPE offering confidential 
was insufficient to impose any duty on him not to trade on the 
information he learned.  Even though Cuban stated he could not sell 
given his knowledge of material, nonpublic information, he sold anyway.  
Yet under current misappropriation theory, the district court held him not 
liable for insider trading.  Moreover, notwithstanding its reversal of the 
district court, the Fifth Circuit did little to ensure a clear understanding of 
whether Cuban owed Mamma.com a duty not to trade on the 
information. 
The characterization of insider trading as fraud by omission has 
created problems for enforcement efforts in the misappropriation context.  
Individuals who have no fiduciary duty or similar relationship with the 
source of the misappropriated information can escape liability, 
                                                                                                                       
Supreme Court held that to determine whether a complaint’s scienter allegations are sufficient, a 
court must consider inferences urged by the plaintiff and also competing inferences rationally drawn 
from the facts alleged.  Id.  “To qualify as ‘strong’ within the intendment of §21D(b)(2), we hold, an 
inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at 
least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”  Id. 
 284. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319 n.3. 
 285. Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987, S. 1380, 100th Cong. § 2(b) (1st Sess. 1987). 
 286. SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477, 493 (N.D. Tex. 2005). 
 287. Id.; see also United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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notwithstanding the fact they took another’s material, nonpublic 
information and used it for trading purposes, resulting in significant 
personal profits or avoidance of financial losses.  The mere fact that no 
relationship exists requiring these traders to disclose their trading 
intentions in no way diminishes the wrongfulness of their actions.  Thus, 
to find insider trading liability by virtue of a commission of a wrong 
(misfeasance), as opposed to a failure to disclose (nonfeasance), would 
allow appropriate liability without necessitating obstructive line-drawing. 
Allowing insider trading liability due to use of another’s information 
still comports with Rule 10b-5 requirements for liability.  The necessary 
deception exists in the commission of the wrong itself.  For example, 
Mark Cuban arguably deceived Mamma.com by promising to keep the 
information confidential, yet trading on it anyway.  Because he used 
another’s information for commission of a knowingly wrongful trade, the 
requisite deception exists.  Moreover, he arguably deceived 
Mamma.com’s shareholders.  Cuban avoided significant losses when he 
sold using information other shareholders were not privy to.  The 
deception lies in the irregularity of the playing field upon which they all 
traded.  And as Cuban’s trades were knowingly wrong—by his own 
admission—he satisfies the scienter requirement for liability. 
While many may find this proposed change, and resultant expansion 
of liability, an anathema, the fact is that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do 
not require a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and 
confidence to satisfy the necessary deception.  Deception may exist by 
any appropriate means.  To require such a relationship creates an 
inevitable enforcement gap, as well as judicial inconsistencies.  Allowing 
the use of the information itself to serve as the basis for liability will 
close this gap and provide greater consistency, congruency, and stability.  
One who trades improperly on another’s information is at least as 
culpable as the inside corporate executive, and the laws should reflect 
this culpability. 
